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INTRODUCTION
Proponents of constitutional reform in the United States maintain that
constitutional change must be initiated from outside the regular channels of
constitutional politics.1 In his book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, Professor
Sandy Levinson, the most prominent champion of constitutional revision or
replacement,2 first argues that certain provisions in the U.S. Constitution
prevent governing officials from making coherent policies that are responsive

∗ Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. Much
thanks to Sandy Levinson, Jack Balkin, Jim Fleming, and other participants in this
Symposium for their advice. Special thanks to the members of the Boston University Law
Review for the editorial assistance and help preparing this manuscript for publication.
1 See
SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 23-24 (2006)
(discussing the inability to achieve needed constitutional reforms through textually defined
mechanisms, and how this inability creates a necessity for external reforms); LARRY J.
SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: IDEAS TO INSPIRE A NEW GENERATION 225-32
(2007) (arguing that constitutional reform must come from methods such as mock and
actual constitutional conventions, as well as internet debate, while discussing how political
gridlock makes congressional amendments implausible and proposing twenty-three reforms
to improve constitutional functionality).
2 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 391-93 (2012) (“We need a new constitutional convention, one that
could engage in a comprehensive overview of the U.S. Constitution and the utility of many
of its provisions to twenty-first century Americans.” Id. at 391.); LEVINSON, supra note 1, at
168-80 (discussing the need for a referendum to revise substantially or even replace the U.S.
Constitution and the potential to achieve significant reform within the confines of Article
V).
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to the concerns of popular majorities or to the citizenry in general.3 He also
observes that the resulting deformed ordinary politics is incapable of taking the
steps necessary to correct these and other clearly identified constitutional
flaws.4 For this reason, Levinson calls for a national constitutional convention,
the members of which would be chosen by lottery.5 This would prevent the
selection of “single-issue zealots who might . . . prevail in elections,” as
elections are generally held in the United States at present.6 The delegates to
the proposed convention would then be expected to write a new constitution
for the American people to ratify.7
Other contemporary calls for a constitutional convention or constitutional
reform similarly seek an escape from ordinary politics. Each reformer insists
that the constitutional convention or referendum be structured in ways to make
deliberations immune to the ills afflicting the contemporary electoral and
governance processes in the United States. Larry Sabato proposes to escape the
pathologies of contemporary politics by having Congress propose rules for the
convention and the selection of delegates that will make the convention
immune to the ills that presently afflict Congress.8 Akhil Amar proposes to
escape the pathologies of contemporary politics by either a national
referendum on constitutional amendments or a new constitution.9 Richard
Labunski believes that the internet will enable Americans interested in a
second constitutional convention to maneuver around the pathologies of
contemporary politics.10 Political parties are conspicuously absent from the
project of constitutional reform. Under Levinson’s model, citizens discuss the
3 See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 6-9 (“We must recognize that a substantial
responsibility for the defects of our polity lies in the Constitution itself.” Id. at 9.).
4 See id. at 171 (“Given the central thesis of this book, it would be almost selfcontradictory to say that the remedy to our most basic ills lies in ordinary politics.”).
5 LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 391-93.
6 Id. at 392.
7 See id. at 391-93.
8 SABATO, supra note 1, at 205-16.
9 Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside of
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044-46 (1988) (“I believe that the first, most . . .
important, if unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a majority of voters to amend
the Constitution—even in ways not expressly provided for in Article V.”).
10 RICHARD LABUNSKI, THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: HOW THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE CAN TAKE BACK THEIR GOVERNMENT 6 (2000). Specifically, Lubinky argues:
[T]hrough new communication technology such as the Internet, and more traditional
forms of mass media, the American people can organize a series of meetings –
beginning at the congressional district or county level, then moving on to a state
convention, and finally culminating in a national ‘preconvention’ in Washington, D.C.
– where petitions can be written to give to state legislators . . . [which] will propose a
subject area for a constitutional amendment and will ask legislators to forward them to
Congress. . . . Prior to the Internet, such an undertaking would have been almost
impossible.
Id.
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Constitution on their own initiative at potluck dinners and engage in petition
drives.11 When Sabato’s Members of Congress make rules for the
constitutional convention, they do so as Americans rather than as Democrats
and Republicans.12 Labunski’s websites substitute for partisan organization.13
Democratic and Republican Party elites, apparently aware that constitutionally
induced polarization and hyperpartisanship are central to contemporary
constitutional dysfunctions, are assumed to facilitate (or at least not interfere
with) grassroots efforts to break the stranglehold that the two major political
parties have on contemporary constitutional politics.14
These well-intentioned calls for nonpartisan constitutional conventions or
referendums suffer the same difficulties that befell the mice who sought to bell
the proverbial cat. Each proposed solution can be implemented only if the
problem is either assumed away or largely resolved before the proposed
solution is implemented. The mice can bell the cat only if the cat will, for
unknown reasons, not bother the mice during the belling process or if the mice
find some other means for neutralizing the threat of the cat during the belling
process.15 A nonpartisan constitutional convention can resolve the problems
created by hyperpartisanship and polarization only if that polarization will for
unknown reasons not influence the process used to create and staff the
convention, or if Americans find some other means of neutralizing the harms
caused by polarization while establishing the constitutional convention. A
nonpartisan constitutional referendum will not be beset with polarization and
hyperpartisanship only if constitutional reformers first successfully find a way
to mitigate substantially the constitutional problems that polarization and
hyperpartisanship cause. If Americans successfully overcome polarization
when creating the nonpartisan constitutional convention or referendum,
however, then they have demonstrated that they can resolve the problems that
polarization causes without formal constitutional reform. Acknowledging that
11 LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 173-74 (proposing a constitutional convention generated
from citizen-driven dialogue and petition drives to offer substantially more equal
representation by population than exists in the current congressional system).
12 See SABATO, supra note 1, at 205-08 (describing his expectation that Members of
Congress would reach political consensus on ground rules for a constitutional convention
“lest their constituents take revenge on them at the ballot box”).
13
See LABUNSKI, supra note 10, at 231-44 (“[A] growing number of campaign strategists
believe the Internet is likely to become a genuinely important political tool by the 2000
presidential election.”).
14 See id. at 242-46 (discussing the difficulties that political advocates who use the
internet to seek reform will face, including cost, political hostility, and possible legal
action); SABATO, supra note 1, at 9-10 (“Many of our nation’s most prominent elites will
resist such an approach. . . . Some sincerely and others conveniently believe that a
Constitutional Convention [made possible by the internet] would become ‘runaway’ and
enact destructive changes from the far right or left.”).
15 See AESOP, The Mice in Council, in AESOP’S FABLES 2 (V.S. Vernon Jones trans.,
Avenel Books 1912) (1484).
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political success, a nonpartisan convention might immediately disband, serve
other purposes, or merely take the steps necessary to entrench the
constitutional politics that substantially mitigated the baneful influence of
polarization on the electoral and governance processes in the United States.16
Constitutional reformers who propose belling the partisan cats do so because
they regard the structure of contemporary constitutional politics as the problem
to be overcome and attribute flaws in the small-c constitutional order to flaws
in the big-C Constitution or constitutional text. Levinson maintains that certain
constitutional provisions directly promote undemocratic and inefficient
government,17 and are partly responsible for generating political institutions
and practices that exacerbate dysfunctional government in the United States.18
When prominent citizens complain of polarization and other politics ills,
Levinson asks them “to ‘connect the dots’ between our ‘institutions’ and the
Constitution that created them.”19 Polarization, for example, is partly a
consequence of the constitutional system used to elect Members of Congress.20
Constitutional reform must therefore be performed outside the infected normal
channels of ordinary constitutional politics and be designed to alter
fundamentally what constitutes ordinary constitutional politics in the United
States.21 Given the improbability of the cat voluntarily foregoing chasing the
mice, the power structure in the basement must be changed by means outside
the system of present governance.
16

For example, members of the convention might agree on a number of constitutional
roundabouts that neutralize the baneful influence of such constitutional provisions as the
Electoral College and state equality in the Senate. See Vikram David Amar, Rewriting the
Constitution’s Basic “Structural” Provisions: When a Constitutional Convention for
Electoral Change Is Necessary, and What It Might Be Expected to Accomplish, 7 ELECTION
L.J. 245, 248-51 (2008) (discussing the limitations of proposed reforms to electoral politics
and Supreme Court terms that stem from entrenched partisanship and federalism).
17 See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 25, 166; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC
IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 73-120 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the history of the
Electoral College, “inherent democratic defects” in the electoral process, and constitutional
responses to the problems of representation and democratic participation).
18 See Sanford Levinson, What Are We to Do About Dysfunction? Reflections on
Structural Constitutional Change and the Irrelevance of Clever Lawyering, 94 B.U. L. REV.
1127, 1131-33 (2014) (outlining a broad argument covering two of Levinson’s own books
regarding the need for a constitutional convention to address inexorable deficiencies in the
current Constitution that make needed reform within its confines impossible).
19 Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956, 972
(2012) (drawing the connections between constitutional structure, dysfunction, and public
dissatisfaction with government institutions).
20 See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 147-48 (explaining how the “formal, locality-based
institutional structure set out on the Constitution,” which established a framework for
representation, was incapable of forestalling the Civil War, and describing how modern
politics, which is less regionally focused, is also ineffective at creating national harmony).
21 See id. at 25-166 (detailing why many provisions of the Constitution stifle needed
reforms, and proposing that reform must therefore come through nontraditional avenues).
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Shifting focus from the big-C Constitution to the small-c constitutional
order casts doubt on this diagnosis. The influence of constitutional provisions
on constitutional politics throughout American history has been a variable
rather than a constant. Constitutional provisions that, at present, help to
paralyze and polarize constitutional politics often facilitated pluralist
bargaining during the New Deal and Great Society. The American experience
through much of the twentieth century more generally demonstrates that the
Constitution of the United States does not inhibit government officials from
performing basic government functions when political competition exists
largely between two nonideological parties, and demonstrates further that the
Constitution allows two nonideological parties to thrive for long periods of
time. Seen from this historical perspective, contemporary constitutional
disorders are better described as a consequence of two polarized parties trying
to operate within a constitutional order that New Dealers designed to be
managed by two nonideological parties, rather than as timeless defects or the
necessary consequence of an effort to operate an eighteenth-century
constitution in a twenty-first-century world.22
The same failure to understand the dynamic relationship between
constitutional provisions and the politics responsible for mistakenly diagnosing
contemporary constitutional dysfunction are also responsible for failed cures
for this dysfunction. Americans cannot fix the constitutional provisions that
facilitate and exacerbate political polarization by temporarily wishing away the
resulting polarized political order. There are no magical means for escaping the
structure of constitutional politics at a given time. As Professor Stephen
Skowronek observes in Building the New American State, new constitutional
orders are necessarily fashioned through the medium of the ancient regime, at
least when the transition is relatively peaceful.23 Constitutional transitions in a
polarized political order are managed by and designed to serve the interests of
polarized political actors.24

22

See infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 285 (1982) (“Whether a given state
changes or fails to change, the form and timing of the change, and the governing potential in
the change – all of these turn on a struggle for political power and institutional position, a
struggle defined and mediated by the organization of the preestablished state.”). Quentin
Skinner’s observation that all revolutionaries “march backwards into battle” points to the
fact that new constitutional orders are fashioned through the median of the ancient regime,
even when the transition is not peaceful. 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS:
REGARDING METHOD 149-50 (2002) (“[H]owever revolutionary such ideologists may be,
they will nevertheless be committed, once they have accepted the need to legitimize their
actions, to showing that some existing favourable terms can somehow be applied as apt
descriptions of their behaviour. All revolutionaries are to this extent obliged to march
backwards into battle.”).
24 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 23, at 285.
23
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The constitutional reforms promoted by powerful political actors more often
resemble what Professor Ran Hirschl describes as hegemonic preservation than
social revolution.25 Political leaders during the New Deal Era transformed
constitutional practices so that these practices would better fit a constitutional
politics premised on competition between two nonideological parties.26
Contemporary constitutional reform managed by contemporary political
leaders will most likely transform inherited New Deal Era constitutional
practices so they better fit a constitutional politics structured by competition
between two or more ideological parties.27 The transition from one
constitutional order to another will most likely take place either as a result of
an agreement between crucial polarized Democratic and Republican Party
elites or, more likely, as a result of a series of elections that gives one
ideological party the firm control over governing institutions necessary to
transition to a new constitutional order that better reflects that party’s
substantive and procedural constitutional commitments. The nonpartisan
constitutional convention contemporary constitutional reformers desire will be,
at best, a way to consolidate the new constitutional order rather than the crucial
event that transforms the ancient regime.
The challenge Americans face in the early twenty-first century is to
overcome political polarization by constitutional means at a time when each
polarized party prefers the dysfunctional constitutional status quo to a new
constitutional order operated by the rival party, and when each party exercises
the control over at least one constitutional institution necessary to prevent the
birth of a new constitutional order dominated by its rival. Our problem is that
Franklin Roosevelt’s Constitution has become dysfunctional, not that James
Madison’s Constitution is senile.28 The New Deal Constitution was designed to
be run by nonideological parties.29 Courts made the civil liberties policies that
both Republican and Democratic Party elites prefer.30 Elected officials made
the commercial and foreign policies that tended to hew to the political center.31
This constitutional order can be neither operated successfully nor transformed
easily by two ideological parties, particularly when constitutional
disagreements between Republican and Democratic elites are stronger and

25 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2004).
26 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
446-50 (1987) (discussing how agencies created during the New Deal Era were designed to
blend government functions previously kept discrete under separation of powers
jurisprudence, using administrative safeguards against factionalism).
27 See infra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Parts II, III.
29 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 446-50.
30 See 2 HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES 480, 482 (2013).
31 See infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
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cover more issues than disagreements between less affluent, less educated, and
less politically efficacious Republicans and Democrats.
All longstanding constitutional regimes go through cycles of greater or
lesser dysfunction. That Americans are presently experiencing some
constitutional dysfunction is not a constitutional abnormality, a cause for
particular alarm, or an inevitable consequence of operating an eighteenthcentury constitution in a twenty-first-century world. Constitutional
dysfunctions create constitutional crises only when powerful forces within the
constitutional order, often augmented by existing constitutional norms, are able
and have the incentives needed to prevent the formal, semiformal, or informal
constitutional changes necessary to repair identifiable constitutional failings.32
The Madisonian “Constitution Against Parties” did little to inhibit the rise of
political parties that enabled constitutional government to function relatively
effectively throughout the nineteenth century.33 The polarized constitutional
order of the early-twenty-first century, by comparison, inhibits the rise of less
ideological parties that might effectively operate the existing constitutional
order and the sort of constitutional institutions congenial to the functional
operation of a polarized political regime.
The following pages are designed to sharpen debates over whether the
Constitution of the United States and the American constitutional order are
presently dysfunctional, the nature of any dysfunctions, and how underlying
regime flaws are likely to be corrected. Rather than focusing primarily on
constitutional text, this Article explores the dynamic ways in which
constitutional processes have influenced and been influenced by the structure
of constitutional politics. Part I explains why constitutional dysfunction is best
conceptualized as the failure of a constitutional order rather than as a
consequence of a flawed constitutional text, and why dysfunction typically
occurs when a regime is unable to transition from a dysfunctional
constitutional order to better constitutional politics. Part II examines the New
Deal constitutional order, and explains why the transition to a regime operated
by two nonideological parties was fairly painless, and details why that regime
was able to operate successfully under the formal rules established in 1789.
Part III details the increased polarization of the two major parties, highlights
the problems polarized parties that operate the New Deal constitutional order
face, and explains why that polarization also inhibits a transition to a better
constitution order. Those who champion constitutional reform must accept
their incapacity to bell the partisan cats. Most likely, the present constitutional
dysfunction will end only with the triumph of one major party. A slight chance

32 See MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 14472 (2013).
33 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 40-41, 64-73 (1969) (describing how
modern political parties gained popularity as their sophistication, discipline, and ability to
connect with expanding electorates increased).
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exists that Americans will find a way to strengthen more centrist tendencies in
the present constitutional order. That success, however, will more likely
require cooperation from partisan elites than a successful escape from the
conditions of contemporary politics.
I.

DYSFUNCTIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS

Most constitutions do not remain functional for long periods of time. Tom
Ginsburg and his fellow researchers observe that fifty percent of all
constitutions do not survive their adolescence.34 The average national
constitution, they find, is replaced in less than twenty years.35 Constitutional
orders function as expected for similarly short periods of time. The United
States Constitution of 1789 collapsed in 1800.36 The post–Civil War
Constitution was in shreds by 1876, if not by 1868.37 Similar accounts exist of
other longlasting constitutional democracies. The texts survive, but the politics
are not constrained, created, or constructed as the Framers imagined.38
The capacity of longlasting constitutions to be “preserv[ed]-throughtransformation”39 points to an important distinction between constitutional
texts and constitutional orders. Since 1789, Americans have been governed
largely by the same foundational text while experiencing multiple
constitutional orders.40 Scholars disagree about the precise number of
constitutional orders, but few would dispute that the way in which the
34 See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 129-31
(2009) (analyzing the creation and dissolution of nearly every national constitution since
1789 in order to evaluate information such as the average durations and lifespans of
constitutions).
35 See id. at 129-31, 213.
36 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3-8 (2005) (outlining the electoral
problems of the 1800–1801 election that necessitated reform of the 1787 Constitution).
37 See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 115, 122-40 (1994) (detailing the Civil War Amendments, political and Supreme
Court responses, and the subsequent dismantling of civil rights legislation at the end of the
nineteenth century). See generally Mark A. Graber, Constructing Constitutional Politics:
The Reconstruction Strategy for Protecting Rights (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (discussing the context and history of the post–Civil War amendments).
38 See Eivind Smith, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD
CONSTITUTIONS, at xi, xix (Eivind Smith ed., 1995) (“Countries in which old constitutional
texts are subject to judicial enforcement are especially bound to live with a considerable gap
between the philosophical and political concepts of the framers and those prevailing
today.”).
39 Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 83 & n.421 (2013)
(arguing in the context of gay marriage that messaging used in constitutional debates shifts
from negative to positive in order to recharacterize arguments while still retaining
fundamental perspectives).
40 See discussion infra Parts II, III.
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Constitution constrained, created, constructed, and constituted politics in
Jacksonian America differed substantially from the way in which the
Constitution performed those same functions after the New Deal.41 Americans
in 2013 live in a different constitutional universe than did their great-great
grandparents in 1913, even though only a few constitutional amendments of
any importance were ratified during the last 100 years. Presidents perform
different functions, the Supreme Court is expected to protect fundamental
rights unheard of in previous centuries, and administrative agencies perform
tasks that were once performed, if at all, by elected officials.42 Many American
states, by comparison, change their constitutional text frequently without
altering basic features of that state’s constitutional order.43 The Louisiana
Constitution of 1913, which was proposed and ratified by citizens bent on
improving sewers in New Orleans, for example, did little to adjust the way
politics was created, constrained, constructed, and constituted in that state.44
Constitutional orders are characterized by a set of central purposes or
commitments (for example, to advance the one true religion, to promote racial
equality, or to grow the economy), various institutions designed to achieve
those purposes (for example, a life-tenured judiciary or competition between
two major political parties), and a culture composed of people who, to some
degree, share various constitutional commitments and are capable of operating
the relevant constitutional institutions.45 Some elements of a constitutional
order are embedded in a constitutional text. Others are not. The Constitution of
the United States mandates a life-tenured federal judiciary but is silent on the
structure of partisan competition.46 In healthy regimes, formal, semiformal, and
41

Compare 1 HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES
(2013) (dividing the period between 1800 and 1960 into five constitutional
eras), with ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 2000)
(dividing the period between 1800 and 1960 into three constitutional eras).
42 See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (discussing shifts during the New
Deal).
43 Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleabile Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1517 (2009) (indicating that state constitutions
change more often than the U.S. Constitution does due to less stringent requirements to
effect changes).
44
See LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 12-13
(1991) (“The 1913 document . . . included the 66 amendments to the 1898 Constitution that
had been adopted in the intervening years. . . . In the process of incorporating the
amendments, the drafters also revised some provisions and added a few others . . . . These
few changes, however, were annulled by the [state] supreme court.”).
45 See Stephen L. Elkin, The Constitutional Theory of the Commercial Republic, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1933, 1943-49 (2001) (discussing the relationship between political
institutions and constitutional regimes, as seen through institutional action and political
transformation).
46 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
OF GOVERNMENT

620

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:611

informal constitutional practices are mutually reinforcing.47 Madison thought
that the organization of politics in the large republic would buttress the
constitutional commitment to republican government.48 Thaddeus Stevens
thought that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment would generate a
constitutional politics conducive to maintaining the “ascendancy” of the
Republican Party, which in turn would privilege liberal interpretations of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment.49
Constitutional dysfunctions occur when constitutional purposes,
constitutional institutions, and the constitutional culture are misaligned or
disharmonic.50 Some misalignments may occur on the face of the constitutional
text. State equality in the Senate is inconsistent with the constitutional
commitment to democracy.51 Other misalignments result from informal
constitutional changes that affect how the constitution is interpreted and
implemented at a given time.52 The structure of party politics in 1850 inhibited
what Republicans thought was a constitutional commitment to place slavery on
a “course of ultimate extinction”53 and what the Framers thought was a
constitutional commitment to prevent contentious disputes over human
bondage from disrupting national union.54
47 See GRABER, supra note 32, at 144-72 (discussing formal, semiformal, and informal
proposals for constitutional change, and how those proposals can address constitutional
deficiencies); Elkin, supra note 45, at 1945-49 (describing nature of political rule in formal
processes and informal actions that define the scope of power and representation in “good
regimes”).
48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“[E]xtensive republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public
weal . . . .”).
49 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865) (statement of Rep. Stevens)
(arguing that Section 2, which reduces the representation of states who refuse suffrage to
males over twenty-one years, was necessary to prevent representatives from southern states
from claiming inordinate political power in “the White House and the halls of Congress,”
with “the reestablishment of slavery [being] the inevitable result” – suffrage being key to the
“Republican ascendancy” by more equally dividing representation).
50 See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 1-33 (2010) (explaining
why constitutional identity and “dissonance within and around the constitution” are central
to understanding constitutional dysfunction).
51 See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 61-62 (comparing the Framers’ desire for equal
representation to how the structure of the Constitution is antithetical to even moderate
reform of Senate representation).
52 See, e.g., JACOBSOHN, supra note 50, at 136-212 (detailing how amendments and court
interpretations of constitutional law affect and are affected by U.S. citizens’ understanding
of both the Constitution and emulating foreign models, such as those in Israel, Ireland, and
India).
53 Abraham Lincoln, “A House Divided”: Speech at Springfield Illinois (June 16, 1858),
reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461, 461 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953).
54 MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 105-06
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Dysfunctional constitutions and dysfunctional constitutional orders are
different phenomena, even if they are often related. Citizens can experience a
dysfunctional constitution without living in a period of dysfunctional
constitutional order. They may recognize that a constitution is not serving
basic regime purposes and go about replacing that constitution with a better
fundamental law.55 The underlying constitutional order in these circumstances
is quite functional, because people are able to recognize that their constitution
has ceased to constrain and construct politics in appropriate ways, and have the
capacity to ratify a new constitution that does constrain and construct politics
in appropriate ways. The underlying constitutional order during the 1780s was
quite functional in this sense. Americans recognized that the Articles of
Confederation were dysfunctional and were able to replace that text with the
more functional Constitution of the United States.
Citizens can also experience a dysfunction within a constitutional order
without necessarily experiencing a dysfunctional constitutional order. Some
informal constitutional practices may prevent a constitution from appropriately
constraining and constructing politics. A regime’s education system, for
example, may not inculcate students with the respect for fundamental civil
rights necessary to achieve the constitutional commitment to a free society.
Rather than change the civil rights that a constitution protects or the
constitutional commitment to a free society, citizens in that regime may reform
the underlying educational system so that voters and officials are more likely
to be motivated to protect existing civil rights. In these circumstances both the
constitutional text and constitutional order as a whole are quite functional,
because people are able to identify and reform political practices that inhibit
the constitution from appropriately constructing and constraining politics.
Martin Van Buren demonstrated how a constitutional order can be reformed
without changes to the constitutional text when he and his political allies
created a party of the people that Democrats believed would better enable
Americans to maintain the original constitutional commitments to limited
government and federalism.56
Constitutional dysfunction is the stuff of ordinary constitutional politics. No
constitution constrains, creates, constructs, or constitutes politics as any framer
or ratifier expects. Framers make mistakes about how constitutions will work.
(2006) (describing how the Framers structured the Constitution and the balances of power it
prescribes to delay a national debate over slavery so as to preserve national unity, and how
this structure shaped party politics through the Civil War).
55 See JACOBSOHN, supra note 50, at 15-18 (“In the United States the difficulties in
adapting the [Constitution] to changing circumstances is a staple of Government 101. That
predicament, however, has inspired some very creative efforts to construct alternate
understandings to overcome the formal obstacles to constitutional transformation.”).
56 See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 35-50 (2002);
JOEL H. SILBEY, MARTIN VAN BUREN AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN POPULAR POLITICS,
at xii-xiii (2002).
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The Constitution of the United States, designed to prevent the rise of political
parties, could be operated effectively only by political parties.57 Framers fail to
predict informal constitutional changes that alter how constitutional institutions
function. Southerners who anticipated that the House of Representatives would
become a bastion of proslavery sentiment were stunned when the U.S.
population grew in an unexpected, northwestward direction.58 Even when a
constitution functions as expected, citizens may make new demands on a
constitutional order that the framers did not anticipate. Americans now expect
the national government to solve problems that they believed were state
matters in the early nineteenth century.59 Constitutional orders are as fickle as
constitutions. The Mexican War wreaked havoc with the efforts of Jacksonian
politicians to establish a constitutional order that would facilitate bisectional
compromises on slavery.60
Constitutional change is as much the stuff of ordinary constitutional politics
as is constitutional dysfunction. Politicians sometimes react to constitutional
failures by changing the foundational text of the regime. Americans in 1789
replaced the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution. Rather than
replacing the constitution outright, political leaders may also reconfigure the
underlying constitutional order. During the 1930s, the way in which American
governing institutions functioned, the services they provided, and the limits on
their powers were transformed, even though the constitutional text remained
untouched.61 Donald Lutz’s observation that nations with hard-to-amend
constitutions typically have fairly loose practices of constitutional
interpretation may also capture broader dimensions of constitutional change.62
57

See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 1-12
(1999) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how representative government could work in a large
complex society like our own without party politics.”).
58 GRABER, supra note 54, at 126-28 (discussing population shifts in the early nineteenth
century and their impact on party politics, constitutional dysfunction, and national
disharmony).
59 See R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” Is Not Our
Central Problem and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768
(2014) (manuscript at 2) (“[O]ur central problem is not that government ‘can’t get anything
done’ or that our institutions have become insulated from public opinion, but rather that we
are doing so many things and responding to so many political demands that we are
incapable of resolving the serious conflicts among them.”); see also GRABER, supra note 32,
at 247 (indicating that the recent financial crisis may have been the result of “a
constitutional mismatch between [American] demands on government and government
capacity to satisfy those demands”).
60 GRABER, supra note 54, at 151-53.
61 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 279-382 (1998)
(discussing how President Roosevelt, the New Deal Congress, and the Hughes Court created
“the modern activist state”); GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 417-22.
62 Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION 237, 241-42 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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Perhaps all nations experience fundamental constitutional change at the same
rate, the only difference being whether the crucial step in the transition process
is an alteration in the formal constitutional text or alterations in those
semiformal and informal constitutional practices that make up a constitutional
order.
Constitutional failures that inhibit only the functioning of a discrete element
of a constitutional order are often easy to remedy, as long as formal,
semiformal, and informal channels of constitutional change remain open.63
Constitutional politics during the early republic provide one example of a
successful constitutional repair.64 The original constitutional system for
electing the President quickly broke down.65 The rules mandated by Article II
almost failed to produce a winner in the 1800 national election, and created
severe political difficulties during the 1824 national election.66 Americans
responded to these events by first changing the constitutional text and then
transforming the constitutional order. Political actors ratified the Twelfth
Amendment in 1804 and transitioned during the 1830s from a deferential
political culture to a party system that, for twenty years, was able to operate the
constitutional system for electing the President relatively smoothly.67
Constitutional failures create severe constitutional crises only when they
infect the mechanisms for constitutional change as well as the immediate
functioning of the constitutional order. The constitutional failures that occurred
during the 1850s, for example, were not as localized as the previous
breakdown in the original constitutional politics for selecting the President.68
Constitutional institutions in 1860 privileged the election of sectional
extremists in Congress and a President who sought support only from northern

63

See GRABER, supra note 32, at 144-72.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 36, at 3-8 (outlining the electoral problems in the 1800
election that necessitated reform of the 1787 Constitution).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 3-8, 93-94 (describing ballot problems and other problems not anticipated by the
original Framers that occured in the 1800 election and that lead to a similar crisis in the
1824 election).
67 See id. at 203-23 (detailing the reforms of the electoral process made possible by the
Twelfth Amendment); RONALD FORMISANO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE:
MASSACHUSETTS PARTIES, 1790S-1840S, at 305-43 (1983) (describing the rise of political
parties at the state level in Massachusetts, the transformation to national organizations, and
their implications for representation and elections); HOFSTADTER, supra note 33, at 212-71
(discussing how modern political parties gained popularity as their sophistication, discipline,
and ability to connect with expanding electorates increased); LEONARD, supra note 56, at
99-155 (exploring the nationalization of political parties, and how this affected
constitutional functionality, constitutional interpretation, and electoral politics).
68 See GRABER, supra note 54, at 153-67 (analyzing political tensions and dysfunction
over national issues such as state admission and presidential elections in the decade
preceding the Civil War).
64
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states.69 One result of this constitutional failure was a breakdown in the
constitutional commitment to bisectional compromise on slavery issues.70 The
other result of this constitutional failure was a breakdown in the constitutional
system’s capacity to change.71 Americans living under a system in which
crucial levers of power were held by sectional extremists could not transition
peacefully into a constitutional order in which constitutional institutions were
structured in ways that privileged compromise on slavery issues; nor could
they transition peaceably into a constitutional order that was either all free or
all slave.72 A civil war was necessary to create a new, more functional
regime.73
Classical realignment theory recognized that healthy polities experience
fairly consistent cycles of constitutional dysfunction and alteration. Walter
Dean Burnham’s seminal work on American political development observes:
The socioeconomic system develops but the institutions of electoral
politics and policy formation remain essentially unchanged. Moreover,
they do not have much capacity to adjust incrementally to demand arising
from socioeconomic dislocations. Dysfunctions centrally related to this
process become more and more visible, until finally entirely classes,
regions, or other major sections of the population are directly injured or
come to see themselves as threatened by imminent danger. Then the
triggering event occurs, critical realignments follow, and the universe of
policy and of electoral coalitions is broadly redefined.74
The following pattern best translates the idiom of American political
development into the language of American constitutional development:
distinctive constitutional orders form, the citizens of which are able to operate
fairly successfully constitutional institutions as vehicles for pursuing broadly
shared constitutional purposes; over time constitutional misalignments occur;

69

Id. at 153-54, 162-67 (“Partisan dynamics and constitutional malfunctions . . . played
a[n] important . . . role. . . . Slavery became the issue of choice because Article II enabled
free-state coalitions to capture the presidency without winning any slave-state votes or
popular majorities and because the processes for electing national officials in local elections
prescribed by Article I privileged sectional appeals. . . . Constitutional rules frequently
facilitated the election of free-state congressmen who held more extreme antislavery views
than the average voter in their state or district.”).
70 See id. at 154-56 (“The collapse of the Whig Party, the weakening of the Northern
Jacksonians, and the rise of Republicans destroyed the Democrats’ bisectional coalition for
national expansion [alternating slave and free states].” Id. at 155.).
71 Id. at 156-67 (detailing how disagreements over slavery within parties caused
substantial fracturing, which led to hyperpartisanship, impairing reform and compromise in
Congress leading up to the Civil War).
72 For the detailed argument in this paragraph, see GRABER, supra note 54, at 153-67.
73 See id.
74 WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 181 (1970).
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new social groups arise that do not share basic regime principles; governing
institutions no longer function in ways that promote constitutional ends; and
eventually, the constitutional order crumbles and, in a healthy regime, is either
replaced by a new constitution, a new constitutional order, or both. This
account is consistent with Burnham’s understanding that realignments are
constitutional phenomena. He refers to “the constitution-making role of the
American voter”75 during critical realignments and insists that such
realignments are necessary to maintain the broader regime.76 As Burnham
explains, critical realignment:
[H]as been the chief means through which an underdeveloped political
system can be recurrently brought once again into some balanced
relationship with the changing socioeconomic system, permitting a
restabilization of our politics and a redefinition of the dominant Lockian
political formula in terms which gain overwhelming support from the
current generation.77
Mistakenly, classical realignment theory insisted that critical elections
played a crucial role in this cycle of dysfunction and alteration. Such elections,
Burnham maintains, replace an old regime with a new dominant party, a new
party system, and a new constitutional order.78 More recent scholarship
questions whether critical elections are the “mainsprings” of major political or
constitutional change in the United States.79 Constitutional practices that
characterize one constitutional order may decay and be replaced over time
rather than be abandoned in a single burst of electoral energy. David
Mayhew’s analysis of national elections “points to gentle party decline across
many decades . . . not to a valley-peak-valley realignment model.”80 Karen
Orren and Stephen Skowronek maintain that constitutional politics in the
United States is characterized by “intercurrence.”81 The American regime, in

75

Id.
Id. at 180-87 (describing changing party alignments and identification shifts, and how
these changes affect perceptions of and adherence to constitutional regimes).
77 Id. at 181-82.
78 See WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100-01
(1982) (detailing the cycle of political dysfunction, discontent, and critical electoral
realignments).
79 For a particularly good set of essays, including Walter Dean Burnham’s defense of
realignment theory, see THE END OF REALIGNMENT? INTERPRETING AMERICAN ELECTORAL
ERAS (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991).
80 DAVID R. MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS 65 (2002).
81 KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 108 (2004) (discussing the theory of intercurrence, according to which
autonomous institutions change in regular cycles, where citizens experience dysfunction,
politicians capitalize on that with messaging, and moderate reforms occur).
76
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their view, consists of relatively autonomous institutions with distinctive
cycles of dysfunction and alteration.82
What realignment theory nevertheless contributes to constitutional theory is
the idea that constitutional orders must have the internal resources necessary to
adjust as political, social, cultural, technological, and demographic changes
increasingly misalign constitutional commitments, government institutions,
and the broader constitutional culture. The adjustment processes include
critical elections, secular realignments, reform of informal constitutional
institutions, changes in the functioning of existing constitutional institutions,
constitutional workarounds,83 reinterpretation of existing constitutional
provisions, constitutional amendments, new constitutions, or most likely, many
of the above in combination.84 The Jacksonian Era, for example, witnessed the
rise of political parties, the transformation of the Senate and cabinet, sharply
narrower constructions of national power, and the substantial revision or
replacement of many state constitutions.85
The way in which modified realignment theory emphasizes the processes for
transforming a constitutional order cannot and should not be reduced to
analysis about the difficulty or merits of formal constitutional change. Whether
provisions such as Article V, which make the Constitution of the United States
difficult to amend formally, constitute “the most important bars of our
constitutional iron cage precisely because it works to make practically
impossible needed changes in our polity”86 depends on how, in different times
and places, provisions for constitutional amendment influence and are
influenced by semiformal and informal processes for constitutional changes.
As discussed previously, hard-to-amend constitutions are often interpreted
more flexibly.87 Even those constitutional provisions that seem incapable of
creative interpretation have not inhibited important constitutional change. The
United States Senate was transformed during the early nineteenth century from
an institution that resembled, in many respects, the English House of Lords, to
an institution that functioned quite similarly to the House of Representatives,
even though no formal constitutional change was made to the rules for electing

82

See id. at 108-11.
See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1514-15
(2009).
84 Id. at 1508-14 (describing how constitutional reform advocates use workarounds, a
concept that encompasses many of the above adjustments, to improve functionality without
completely dismantling the Constitution itself).
85 See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 185-90. See generally DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY,
AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE 1820S (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 2010) (1966) (recounting debates from the constitutional conventions that took
place in Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia in the 1820s).
86 LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 160.
87 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the breakdown and restructuring
of constitutional order around the Civil War).
83
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Senators or how Senators influenced lawmaking.88 By forcing Americans to
live under existing constitutional norms, Article V may facilitate vital,
informal constitutional changes that promote greater constitutional democracy.
No guarantee exists that restricting exit options will improve the quality of
voice. Strict divorce rules that probably improve some marriages almost
certainly make other marriages a living hell. The point, as Albert Hirschmann
makes in a related context, is that no ideal balance between exit and voice, or
formal, informal, and semiformal constitutional changes, exists in a vacuum.89
In order to assess the capacity of a constitutional order to transform in response
to increased systemic dysfunctions, reformers must examine how those
dysfunctions facilitate or impede all means for constitutional change, not just
those listed in the constitutional text.
The American constitutional experiences during the twentieth and earlytwenty-first centuries demonstrate how the same constitutional rules that, in
some circumstances facilitate, or at least do not obstruct, transition to a better
constitutional order impede or prevent citizens in other circumstances from
belling the cats responsible for maintaining a dysfunctional constitutional
status quo. Constitutional texts from the birth of the republic failed to cabin
constitutional politics. Americans in the nineteenth century successfully
transformed a “Constitution Against Parties” into a constitutional order
operated by the party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War.90
Americans by the middle of the twentieth century had successfully transformed
a constitutional order operated by the party of the people who remained loyal
during the Civil War into a constitutional order operated by two nonideological
parties and a federal judiciary whose decisions reflected the liberal attitudes of
elites in both major partisan coalitions.91 This constitutional order served basic
constitutional purposes about as well as humanly possible, even though the
constitutional text was over 150 years old and contained numerous provisions
that seemed “stupid.”92 That order began breaking down during the last part of
the twentieth century. The nonideological parties of the New Deal/Great
Society Era gradually evolved into two more ideological parties that structure
contemporary constitutional politics.93 Our constitutional order is presently
dysfunctional because these two ideological parties, each competing to be the

88 See ELAINE K. SWIFT, THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN SENATE: RECONSTITUTIVE
CHANGE IN CONGRESS, 1787-1841, at 1 (1996) (describing the original constitution of the
Senate and changes to informal and semiformal Senate procedural rules that allowed the
Senate to develop a more American identity, akin to that of the House of Representatives).
89 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 124 (1970) (rejecting the possibility that there is “some
optimal mix of exit and voice”).
90 Graber, supra note 37.
91 GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 419, 421.
92 Id. at 417.
93 Id. at 422.
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party of the people, cannot transform or operate efficiently a constitutional
order designed to be operated by two nonideological parties.
II.

THE VIEW FROM MIDCENTURY: A CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESS STORY

The constitutional order in the United States functioned fairly well
throughout most of the twentieth century.94 Politics in the New Deal/Great
Society regime was structured so that American citizens achieved the basic
goals of the regime and resolved controversies consistently with broadly
shared norms. Public offices were filled and budgets were agreed on, even
when each major political party controlled at least one branch of the national
government. During the global economic crisis of the 1930s that toppled
several constitutional democracies, the American regime remained vibrant. A
few demagogues aside, the United States was never in serious danger of
drifting into dictatorship. The United States effectively fought and won a world
war on two fronts and on at least four continents. In the postwar period the
American political economy was the envy of the world. The American
economy grew at a steady rate, aiding and aided by an expanding and
increasingly affluent middle class.95 The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the end of
racial apartheid in the United States and other dramatic improvements in the
civil rights and civil liberties actually enjoyed by American citizens.
Americans at mid-century experienced a functional constitutional order even
though the United States during the 1950s and 1960s could hardly be confused
with the Garden of Eden or Shangri-La. Political activists, journalists, and
scholars documented vast inequalities, rights violations, and political
deficiencies. Nevertheless, George Bernard Shaw aptly pointed to the primary
source of American constitutional ills when he quipped that “democracy is a
system insuring that the people are governed no better than they deserve.”96
The governance problems Americans confronted during the New Deal and
Great Society were either governance problems experienced by all western
democracies (for example, employment and the Cold War) or more rooted in
public opinion than the constitutional text. The United States was plagued by
severe racial inequalities because many Americans who were committed to
white supremacy happily flouted constitutional norms. George Wallace, for
example, was more concerned with preserving segregation than taking
seriously the Equal Protection Clause.97 A fair case can be made that a
94 For the best accounts of this time period, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM
FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999); JAMES T.
PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1971 (1996).
95 See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (4th ed. 1984)
(describing the growth of the middle class caused by increases in manufacturing and
demand following World War II).
96 See Mark Graber, ‘No Better than They Deserve:’ Dred Scott and Constitutional
Democracy, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 589, 589 (2007) (quoting George Shaw).
97 See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE
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constitutional order that privileged judicial supremacy generated more racial
equality than might have been the case had the United States adopted a more
Westminster constitutional order. As Kevin McMahon details, national elected
officials who were unwilling to challenge Jim Crow directly were willing to
appoint and confirm to the federal bench judges known to oppose racial
segregation.98
There existed a broad national consensus throughout New Deal and Great
Society Eras that the Constitution of the United States was a national blessing.
Future Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in 1939 celebrated “a
Constitutional Renaissance at the present time–a rediscovery of the
Constitution.”99 Congressmen Maury Maverick in the same year declared, “we
need some changes in our constitutional practice, but none in our Constitution.
We have in our written Constitution all the constitutional authority necessary
for effective government.”100 Overwhelming majorities of Americans rejected
any basic change to the constitutional text.101 Rexford Tugwell and the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions spent a decade fruitlessly trying to
convince Americans that an industrial society could not thrive under a
Constitution drafted for an agrarian regime.102 Tugwell was regarded at most
as a curiosity and his works were ignored.103
The consensual constitutional celebration developed during the New Deal
was as rooted in experience as it was in habit or unthinking veneration, at least
among Americans on the political left. While conservatives had long promoted
a “cult of the Constitution,”104 American Progressives during the generation
before President Franklin Roosevelt took office were more skeptical. In the
period between 1880 and 1930, such distinguished scholars as Charles Beard,
President Woodrow Wilson, and J. Allen Smith raised significant criticisms of

NEW CONSERVATIVISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 82-109 (1995)
(documenting the origins of southern resistance to desegregation).
98 See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004).
99 Robert H. Jackson, Back to the Constitution, 25 A.B.A. J. 745, 745 (1939).
100 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 381-82 (1986).
101 See id. at 316, 331 (discussing the results of a poll that surveyed whether U.S. citizens
wanted to amend the Constitution).
102 See id. at 332-34 (discussing Tugwell’s work, which produced forty drafts of a new
constitutional model that proposed significant changes to legislative representation, “radical
reorganization of the entire judiciary,” and creation of a separate regulatory branch of
government to address issues particular to an industrialized society).
103 See id. at 333-34.
104 See id. at 206-13, 219-35 (discussing the blind and patriotic devotion to the
Constitution of the “Cult,” and how this devotion inhibited dialogue on structural reform
while helping to teach many Americans how to enforce certain constitutional provisions,
such as due process).
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the Constitution as framed in 1787.105 After strongly suggesting that the
English Constitution was “superior” to the Constitution of the United States,106
Wilson asserted “the federal government lacks strength because its powers are
divided, lacks promptness because its authorities are multiplied, lacks
wieldiness because its processes are roundabout, lacks efficiency because its
responsibility is indistinct and its actions without competent direction.”107
Beard clamed, “this crowned Constitution with its halo has been the bulwark of
every great national sin—from slavery to monopoly.”108 Most American
liberals after the New Deal, however, were convinced that Americans had
successfully repaired the constitutional order without having to change or
abandon their inherited constitutional text. Franklin Roosevelt articulated the
national ethos during his first inaugural address when he asserted that “[o]ur
Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet
extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of
essential form.”109
The Constitution of the United States at mid-century seemed particularly
attractive when Americans and foreigners adopted a comparative perspective.
David Fontana observes a surge in articles on comparative law published by
law reviews during the 1950s and 1960s, most of which were “about exporting
American constitutional ideas to the rest of the world.”110 Other constitutions
in these essays were more often referred to as negative examples than as
alternative and possibly better means for governing.111 Numerous American

105

See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
UNITED STATES (reprt. 1986); JAMES ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN, INFLUENCE AND RELATION TO
DEMOCRACY (1907); WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 15th ed. 1901) (1885).
106 WILSON, supra note 105, at 311-18. Wilson describes the inefficiency of the United
States’ form of government, and explains how this inefficiency stems from that fact that the
U.S. government, though modeled on the English constitution in place in 1787, was
designed to avoid singular authority. Id. Wilson further explains that our Constitution’s rigid
structure prevented the kind of flexible arrangements that would have allowed for more
peaceful transitions and shifts in power in England. Id.
107 Id. at 318.
108 KAMMEN, supra note 100, at 201 (“In May 1898, . . . an editorial by young Beard
asserted that ‘this crowned Constitution with its halo has been the bulwark of every great
national sin–from slavery to monopoly.’”).
109 Id. at 259 (quoting Franklin Roosevelt).
110 David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar
Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22-23 (2011).
111 See id. (“[S]ome of the more notable citations to comparative constitutional law . . .
treated the foreign constitutional experience as the negative role model – the experience to
avoid – and the American constitutional experience as the one to prioritize.”); Richard
Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106
YALE L.J. 423, 423-26 (1996) (detailing how antitotalitarian reaction to Nazism and
OF THE
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jurists, most notably Thurgood Marshall, eagerly travelled abroad to help other
nations fashion American-style constitutional institutions.112 Most regimes
welcomed this infusion of American constitutionalism. Time in 1987 claimed
that more than ninety percent of all existing constitutions were modeled after
the Constitution of the United States.113 George Athan Billias’s study of the
comparative constitutional experience concluded that, as of 1989, “the
influence of American constitutionalism abroad was profound in the past and
remains a remarkable contribution to humankind’s search for freedom under a
system of laws.”114
Constitutional debate in the United States for much of the twentieth century
was limited to the proper interpretation of a few provisions and the role of the
Supreme Court as a constitutional authority. Fontana observes, “[t]he most
notable scholars that the legal academy has ever produced wrote about how the
American Constitution should be interpreted and how judicial review should
operate.”115 Barry Friedman describes at great length “the academic obsession
with the countermajoritarian problem” that drove New Deal and post–New
Deal constitutional theory.116 In this theoretical environment, the ratio between
complaints about judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution and
complaints about the Constitution approached infinity. Conservatives objected
to Hughes Court decisions expanding national powers.117 Liberals condemned
restraints on civil rights and liberties.118 Both conservatives and liberals as
vigorously insisted that the fault lay in the interpreters, not the Constitution.119
“If one were to judge from the corpus of constitutional scholarship over the last
sixty years,” Friedman observed at the turn of the twenty-first century, “of all
communism influenced judicial and academic legal thought in the decades following World
War II).
112 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, EXPORTING AMERICAN DREAMS: THURGOOD
MARSHALL’S AFRICAN JOURNEY (2008); see also Fontana, supra note 110, at 12 (providing
examples of international legal scholars who visited the United States and of American law
professors who travelled abroad to advise various countries on constitutional law issues).
113 John Greenwald, A Gift to All Nations, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 92 (“Of the 170
countries that exist today, more than 160 have written charters modeled directly or indirectly
on the U.S. version.”).
114 GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD AROUND THE
WORLD, 1776-1989, at xv (2009); see also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining
Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 764-66 (2012).
115 Fontana, supra note 110, at 4.
116 Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 159 (2002).
117 See KAMMEN, supra note 100, at 273 (describing dramatic reactions to unfavorable
decisions from the Hughes Court, and explaining how conservatives accused the Court of
flouting the Constitution).
118 See id. at 336-37.
119 For conservative objections to national powers, see id. at 269-73. For liberal
objections to restrictions on civil rights and civil liberties, see id. at 336-56.
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of the institutions of American government, it is only the Supreme Court that
presents a particular problem of democratic accountability.”120
The successful functioning of the American constitutional order throughout
much of the twentieth century belies the common claim that the main reason
for constitutional dysfunctions at present is the problems inherent in relying
heavily on a constitutional text largely drafted in the eighteenth century when
governing a twenty-first-century polity.121 Americans were the envy of the
world during the Great Society when they relied on an eighteenth-century text
to govern a mid-twentieth-century polity. No doubt constitutions age
differently than dogs, turtles, or human beings. Still, no good reason exists for
thinking that while constitutions can function for long periods of time, they
begin to expire after 200 years, rather than after reaching the ripe age of 175.
What little evidence we have suggests that constitutions that reach the age of
fifty become almost immortal.122
The success of the American constitutional order throughout much of the
twentieth century also puts so-called “constitutional stupidities” in
perspective.123 A fair case can be made that such constitutional practices as the
Electoral College,124 state equality in the Senate,125 a late date for inaugurating
the President,126 a life-tenured judiciary,127 and the like make the United States
a less democratic and less efficiently governed country. Nevertheless, those
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Friedman, supra note 116, at 162.
See DAHL, supra note 17, at 7-39 (describing how the Framers’ Constitution came up
short due to its inability to predict modern developments and its inclusion of “undemocratic
elements,” and providing possible corrections to these shortcomings, both realized and
unrealized); Sanford Levinson, The United States and Political Dysfunction: “What Are
Elections For?,” 61 DRAKE L. REV. 959, 980-81 (2013) (suggesting that a constitutional
convention is required to reform the Constitution so that it better serves the twenty-first
century polity).
122 See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 34, at 131.
123 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Constitutional
Conversations, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 1, 1-2
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (defining “constitutional
stupidities” as those parts of the Constitution that are “most nonsensical and most harmful
for today’s polity,” and suggesting the use of constitutional stupidities as indicators of the
Constitution’s flaws and starting points for potential reform).
124 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 123, at 15, 15
(describing the Electoral College as “a brilliant eighteenth-century invention that makes no
sense today”).
125 See William Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clauses, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 123, at 35.
126 See Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 123, at 61.
127 See L.H. LaRue, Neither Force Nor Will, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra note 123, at 57.
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practices operated at the margins of American constitutional life for long
periods of time. The United States might have been a little more prosperous
and a little more democratic in 1960 had New Dealers updated the Constitution
to reflect their experience with governance and greater societal commitments
to majoritarianism. Nevertheless, at least as compared to the rest of the world,
the United States was a prosperous, democratic regime with a state of the art
Constitution. Few spoke of a governability crisis or a broken branch of the
national government. Various constitutional practices may have been “nothing
less than a ticking time bomb” that, in the right circumstances, could create
social havoc.128 The lesson of the twentieth century, however, may have been
that these circumstances were sufficiently unlikely to occur during the New
Deal/Great Society regime, and that political actors were better off maintaining
the national defense and fighting poverty under existing constitutional rules
than creating rules that might prove to be liabilities in a different, unforeseen
constitutional order.
Although Americans at most tinkered with the Constitution during the
seventy years after the prohibition amendment was repealed in 1933,129 the
success of the American constitutional order during the mid-twentieth century
could not be traced to Madisonian or Reconstruction institutions operating in
pristine form. Americans celebrated both the framing and the post–Civil War
amendments, but the constitutional order in 1954 was quite different from the
constitutional orders in 1789 or 1868. Whether fundamental constitutional
commitments were altered remains controversial. Many commentators insist
that fundamental substantive constitutional commitments and rules were
abandoned during the “Constitutional Revolution” of the 1930s.130 New
Dealers claimed that they were merely returning to constitutional
understandings dating from the Virginia Plan131 and the Marshall Court.132 The
constitutional institutions designed to secure those constitutional commitments,
however, were unquestionably transformed. Basic changes took place at the
turn of the twentieth century that significantly altered the constitutional politics
underlying both the original and the Civil War Constitution. These textually
128

LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 72.
See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 289-460 (1996).
130
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 61, at 255-382 (“A complex web of doctrine, woven
by two generations of judges in the long period between 1873 and 1932, was swept away in
the space of a decade.” Id. at 256-57.). Ackerman makes a similarly transformative claim
about the constitutional status of race in the Great Society. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1779-82 (2007).
131 See Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1338-40 (1934) (arguing that the Commerce Clause “conformed to the
standard previously approved” by the Constitutional Convention as part of the Virginia
Plan, a broad federal delegation, with respect to “those matters as to which the states were
separately incompetent and in which national legislation was essential).
132 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
129
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invisible transformations played crucial roles in the operation and success of
the New Deal/Great Society constitutional order.
Madison and other Framers designed a “Constitution Against Parties.”133
They believed that factions were the biggest threat to a well-functioning
constitutional politics and designed constitutional institutions that they
believed would prevent the rise of a two-party system in particular.134 Not all
or even many Framers endorsed the Madisonian notion that a large republic
would prevent the rise of a two party system.135 Nevertheless, all agreed that
parties were bad and that constitutional politics should be structured to prevent
their rise. Richard Hofstadter describes how eighteenth-century elites in the
United States thought “the necessary mutual checks would . . . be provided by
the elements of the constitution, and not by parties, which were . . . usually
thought of . . . as forces likely to upset the desired constitutional balance by
mobilizing too much force and passion in behalf of one limited interest.”136
President George Washington famously warned his fellow citizens about the
vices of partisanship. Parties, he stated in his farewell address, “make the
public administration the Mirror of the ill concerted and incongruous projects
of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by
common councils and modified by mutual interests.”137
President Martin Van Buren, President Abraham Lincoln, and
Representative Thaddeus Stevens helped fashion a different constitutional
order, one based on rule by the legitimate party of the people. Van Buren
insisted that factions were endemic to democratic life.138 In order to defeat the
“Money Power,” ordinary citizens had to organize.139 “[T]he absence of a mass
democratic party organization,” Van Buren and his Jacksonian allies believed,
“would permit small knots of neo-Hamiltonian elitists to siphon power to the
federal government, far from the people in their ‘primary assemblages,’ in
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HOFSTADTER, supra note 33, at 40.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 48, at 71 (James Madison) (“Among the
numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”).
135 See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 657-61 (1999)
(revealing that few of those present at the Constitutional Convention took note of Madison’s
arguments for expanding the republic to prevent the rise of political factions and that, far
from developing a discourse consistent with the Madisonian theory, “other delegates
continued to take positions and to make speeches that rested on premises at odds with
Madison’s theory”).
136 HOFSTADTER, supra note 33, at 51.
137 President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in GEORGE
WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 512, 518 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988).
138 STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT 131 (2011)
(describing Van Buren as “the intellectual champion of the permanent party organization”).
139 Id. at 167 (“Van Buren conceptualized his permanent party as an institutional buttress
of the Constitution against corruption . . . .”).
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defiance of the strict constitutional enumeration.”140 Lincoln shared Van
Buren’s enthusiasm for parties, substituting the threat of an undemocratic
“Slave Power” for Van Buren’s obsession with an undemocratic “Money
Power.”141 Rather than attack the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford142
as an instance when the Court took power from elected officials, Lincoln
repeatedly emphasized that the Taney Court ruling was linked to the
Democratic Party and would remain good law only as long as Democrats
controlled the national government. “[T]he Dred Scott decision,” he asserted in
the fifth debate with Stephen Douglas, “never would have been made in its
present form if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by the
elections” and that “the new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of
the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be made, if that party is
not sustained by the elections.”143 The post–Civil War amendments were
rooted in this commitment to the legitimate party of the people as the primary
vehicle for maintaining and achieving basic constitutional commitments.
Thaddeus Stevens, the floor manager for the Fourteenth Amendment,
repeatedly declared that the primary purpose of the proposed constitutional
amendments was to secure the permanent ascendancy of the party of the
people who remained loyal during the Civil War.144 As Senator Henry Wilson
declared during the debates:
The enduring interests of the regenerated nation, the rights of man, and
the elevation of an emancipated race alike demand that the great Union
Republican party, the outgrowth and development of advancing
civilization in America, shall continue to administer the Government it
preserved, and frame the laws for the nation it saved.145
Americans in the 1950s and 1960s experienced a very different
constitutional politics than either Madison or Stevens anticipated. Instead of a
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LEONARD, supra note 56, at 13. For a similar interpretation of Van Buren, see ENGEL,
supra note 138, at 131-69.
141 See SILBEY, supra note 56, at xii (“[L]ong before his emergence to greatness,
[Lincoln] first made his name as an effective builder and manager of the Illinois Whig Party
in the 1830s.”).
142 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
143 Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply, Fifth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at
Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
supra note 53, at 219, 232.
144 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865) (statement of Rep. Stevens) (“If
they should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color, I think there would always be
Union white men enough in the South, aided by the blacks, to divide the representation, and
thus continue the Republican ascendency. If they should refuse to thus alter their election
laws it would reduce the representatives of the late slave States to about forty-five and
render them powerless for evil.”).
145 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 142 (1866).
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constitutional order without parties or structured by a dominant ideological
party, constitutional politics at mid-century was being operated by two
nonideological parties. Woodrow Wilson first noticed this phenomenon during
the late nineteenth century. “Neither of the two principle parties,” he
complained, “is of one mind with itself. Each tolerates all sorts of differences
of creed and variety of aim within its own ranks. . . . They are like armies
without officers, engaged upon a campaign which has no great cause at its
back.”146 Little changed during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.
The Republican Party had a strong liberal wing that provided substantial
support for the New Deal and the Warren Court decisions that expanded civil
rights and liberties.147 Southern Democrats bitterly fought the Warren Court
and opposed many liberal regulatory reforms, particularly those that benefitted
unions.148
A fair case can be made that New Dealers modified rather than abandoned
the “state of courts and parties” that Stephen Skowronek claims structured
constitutional politics at the turn of the twentieth century.149 Elected officials
and judges had distinctive functions, even as those functions were altered
during the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. Nonideological parties regulated
the economy and guided international affairs. Governance by elected officials
was appropriate on these matters, New Deal liberals agreed, because the
Constitution provided few if any limits on national commercial and foreign
policymaking.150 Courts decided questions about civil rights and liberties.
Judicial review was appropriate on these matters, more and more New Deal
liberals came to agree, because the Constitution limited the government’s
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WILSON, supra note 105, at 324.
See NICOL C. RAE, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS: FROM 1952
TO THE PRESENT 25 (1989) (describing a sizeable faction of Republicans who “supported
Roosevelt on the major New Deal measured which came before Congress in 1932-36”);
Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, Polarization, and the
Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L.J. 661, 685 (2013) (“During the 1950s
and 1960s, American elites in both the Republican and Democratic parties tended to support
racial equality, limiting the influence of religion in public life, broad free speech rights, and
providing greater protections for poor persons and persons of color suspected of crimes.”).
148 See NICOL C. RAE, SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS 39-45 (1994) (chronicling Southern
Democrats’ rising dissatisfaction with liberal reform, which was spearheaded by their own
party and liberal Warren Court decisions, beginning in the later years of the New Deal and
coming to a head during the Civil Rights Movement).
149 SKOWRONEK, supra note 23, at 39.
150 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120-29 (1942) (upholding a reading of the
Commerce Clause granting expansive powers to Congress); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-22 (1936) (“[T]he investment of the federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution . . . . [It is] inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.”).
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power to restrict individuals’ rights and the courts were responsible for
maintaining constitutional limits on governmental powers.151
The two nonideological parties remade American constitutional institutions
in their image. Congress became the site for interest group bargaining.152 The
federal judiciary was charged with protecting the pluralist bargaining process
and those excluded from that pluralist bargaining.153 Administrative agencies
provided the expertise necessary for politically efficacious interest groups to
realize the fruits of their legislative bargains.154 The President articulated broad
national visions and ran foreign policy.155 The “Constitution of Settlement”
may have inhibited debates over the precise rules for staffing various
institutions, but the above reforms demonstrate how the broader functions of
all constitutional institutions were very much part of the “Constitution of
Conversation” throughout much of the twentieth century.156
With important exceptions,157 political and constitutional commentators
celebrated a constitutional order operated by nonideological parties. Political
power was constrained by virtue of being dispersed. Domination was
151

See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) (“[C]ourts stand against any
winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and
public excitement.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”).
152 See DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION 106-08 (1951) (describing the rise of association and “increasing demands
upon and through the government” that occurred in the mid-twentieth century).
153 See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 156-59 (1991).
154 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 23, at 13-14 (arguing that the growth of the
administrative state was heavily influenced by government officials who sought to provide
services demanded by interest groups, and who struggled with how best to provide efficient
services).
155 See JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3-9 (1987) (distinguishing the
modern presidency from that of nineteenth century based on its occupiers’ perceived duty
“to promote policy initiatives nationwide”); Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies,
TRANS-ACTION, Dec. 1966, at 7, 7-8 (observing that the post–World War II Presidents rarely
failed to realize their major foreign policy objectives).
156 For a discussion of the “Constitution of Settlement” and the “Constitution of
Conversation,” see LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 19; Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco:
Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1162-68 (2014);
Levinson, supra note 18, at 1136-40.
157 See COMM. ON POLITICAL PARTIES, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY
SYSTEM, in 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. supp. (1950) (arguing for political parties that offer their
members different policy objectives); see also THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY, at x (1969) (deriding post–New
Deal government as an oversized, formless, and impotent mass, incapable of “plan[ning] or
achiev[ing] justice”).
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impossible, Robert Dahl observed, because “[v]irtually no one, and certainly
no group of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence
resources.”158 Freed from ideological commitments, governing officials and
parties were charged with making policies that promoted the interests of most
members of most groups in the United States. Daniel Bell insisted that
ideological politics was anachronistic in light of “the rough consensus among
intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the
desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of
political pluralism.”159 Courts that decided cases on constitutional principle
provided an appropriate balance to pragmatic officials and parties. Prominent
law Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. declared:
[The Supreme Court] is predestined in the long run not only by the
thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its
position in the structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason,
charged with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating
and developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law.160
The constitutional order at mid-century was successful both in operation and
transformation. Constitutional commitments, institutions, and culture were
reasonably well aligned, even though the constitutional order of 1868 had
clearly malfunctioned. In sharp contrast to the Republican founders of that
constitutional order, Americans in the twentieth century were able to transform
a malfunctioning constitutional order peacefully. The transition was not
smooth or in one piece. Transitions never are. Still, neither the constitutional
text drafted in 1789, most notably the provisions on constitutional amendment,
nor the remains of the constitutional order of 1868 proved an iron cage making
impossible an American escape from what many early-twentieth-century
progressives thought was an increasingly dysfunctional constitutional order.
Americans successfully transformed their constitutional order during the
twentieth century in part because the way the Constitution of 1868
malfunctioned facilitated the creation of the Constitution of 1937. The
Constitution of 1868 was designed to entrench the rule of a Republican Party
committed to reconstructing the former Confederate states in the image of the
free labor north.161 The crucial provisions of the Constitution were Sections 2
and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which Thaddeus Stevens maintained
would guarantee that southerners would influence national politics only if
persons of color gained the ballot.162 In practice, neither Section 2 nor Section
158

ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
228 (2d ed. 2005).
159 DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE
FIFTIES 402-03 (rev. ed. 1962).
160 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959).
161 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
162 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
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3 influenced American constitutional development,163 and many Republicans
soon developed priorities other than racial equality.164 The result was that, by
the turn of the twentieth century, a constitutional order designed to be operated
by the legitimate party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War
was already being operated by two nonideological parties. The way in which
partisan competition evolved in the late nineteenth century meant that
constitutional reformers in the twentieth century did not have to undermine the
dominant structure of constitutional politics before transforming the
constitutional order. They had no cats to bell. Theirs was the simpler task of
transforming constitutional institutions so that the Constitution would operate
better in a political universe already structured by two nonideological parties.
III. THE VIEW FROM THE PRESENT
Americans at the turn of the twenty-first century are trying to operate with
two ideological parties a constitutional order that New Dealers designed to be
operated by two nonideological parties. The Constitution of 1937 functioned
better and for a longer period of time than the Constitution of 1868, but New
Dealers proved no more successful than the Framers or Reconstruction
Republicans at permanently entrenching a particular constitutional politics.
American partisan politics began to polarize during the 1970s. By the end of
the century, the liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats of the New
Deal/Great Society Era were an exotic, if not extinct, species. Such
constitutional institutions and practices as multiple veto points and judicial
supremacy, which functioned well when the constitutional order was structured
by two nonideological parties, more often facilitated than alleviated the worst
tendencies of the two polarized parties. These practices that helped stabilize a
163 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF THE
FIRST CENTURY 389 (1895) (“[T]he last sentence of section two of the Fourteenth
Amendment is inoperative wholly . . . . There are no longer any persons living on whom the
provisions of section three can operate.”); George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the
History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV.
93, 124 (1961) (“There never has been a successful implementation of the full provisions of
section 2 of the fourteenth amendment.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260 (2004) (“[N]o discriminating state
lost even a single seat in the House of Representatives when Congress reapportioned
itself.”).
164 See CHARLES W. CALHOUN, CONCEIVING A NEW REPUBLIC: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
AND THE SOUTHERN QUESTION, 1869-1900, at 1-4 (2006) (describing Republicans’ failed
efforts “to salvage the republican experiment in the South” when “[a]ttitudes and public
concerns . . . shifted” in the late nineteenth century); STANLEY P. HIRSHSON, FAREWELL TO
THE BLOODY SHIRT 17 (Quadrangle Paperback, reprt. 1968) (“Fundamentally, this book is
concerned with how and why the Republican party, which after the Civil War passed
numerous laws and set up many organizations to aid the Southern Negro, deserted the
colored man by the 1890’s.”).
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functional New Deal constitutional regime by promoting pluralist bargaining
presently constitute severe barriers to transforming the dysfunctional
contemporary constitutional order.
A.

A Dysfunctional Constitutional Story

Contemporary constitutional politics is haunted by two related phenomena
that did not challenge the mid-twentieth-century regime.165 The first is elite
polarization.166 During the Great Society, on a great many constitutional
questions, Republican and Democratic elites had more in common with each
other than Republican patricians did with Republican plebeians and Democrat
patricians did with Democratic plebeians.167 At present, Republican and
Democratic elites are less likely to agree with each other on basic issues than
are less well educated and less affluent Republicans and Democrats.168 The
second is conflict extension.169 Elites and ordinary members of each party are
more likely to disagree with members of the other party on more issues than at
any time in the recent past. Knowing that someone was for deregulation in
1960 did not enable one to predict that person’s views on racial integration.
Persons who favor lower taxes in 2013, by comparison, are far more likely to
oppose affirmative action and favor torturing terrorists than those who believe
in a more progressive tax system.170
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See Graber, supra note 147, at 684-704.
Id. at 685, 695 (describing how a general consensus among Democratic and
Republican elites due to their elevated financial status facilitated liberal decisionmaking in
the Warren Court, while the modern elites, by contrast, “have less in common with each
other than do ordinary Democrats and Republicans”).
167 See Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 361, 364-66 (1964) (finding a broad consensus among “political influentials” on
the values of governance that does not exist when one extends the statistical inquiry to
include the general electorate).
168 See Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class
Versus the People, in 1 RED AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF
AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 49, 51-52 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006)
(indicating that “American politics today finds a polarized political class” that is
knowledgeable and ideologically driven, which is “competing for the support of a much less
polarized electorate” that is less knowledgeable and “largely nonideological”).
169 See Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and “Conflict
Extension” in the American Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 786-87 (2002) (describing party
identifiers’ extension of “party conflict” into the three main “domestic issue agendas”).
170 See Graber, supra note 147, at 697 (“On almost every issue surveyed, the greatest
percentage of respondents taking the most conservative position were from the most affluent
and highly educated group of Republicans and the greatest percentage of respondents taking
the most liberal position were from the most affluent and highly educated group of
Democrats.”).
166
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The baneful influence of elite polarization and conflict extension is amply
documented elsewhere and by other contributions to this Symposium,171 but
both political commentators and constitutional reformers often fail to connect
or misconnect crucial dots. The American constitutional experience suggests
that present constitutional ills are neither purely a consequence of outdated
constitutional provisions as constitutional reformers suggest172 nor of
polarization as political commentators maintain.173 Such malfunctions as the
failure to staff the federal judiciary and legislative gridlock result from a
misalignment between constitutional commitments, constitutional institutions,
and the constitutional culture. The problem is not polarization or the
Constitution in isolation, but that polarized parties cannot operate effectively
the Constitution of 1937.
The process for staffing the federal judiciary provides a simple illustration
of how the nonideological parties of the mid twentieth century could more
successfully operate the Constitution of 1937 than the polarized parties at
present. A general consensus exists that the contemporary confirmation
process is a “mess,” both because elected officials are unable to fill lower
federal court vacancies for long periods of time and because Supreme Court
confirmation hearings are more prone to grandstanding than enlightenment.174
None of these problems substantially hindered the confirmation process during
171

See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE
GRIDLOCK 19-27 (2003) (describing the impact of party and preference polarization on
political stalemate, and explaining the ideological polarization in Congress along these
lines); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK, at x (2006) (“[T]he growing
ideological polarization of the parties, the transformation of intense partisanship into
virtually tribal politics . . . contributed to a climate on Capitol Hill that we found unsettling
and destructive.”). From this Symposium, see Jack M. Beermann, The New Constitution of
the United States: Do We Need One and How Would We Get One?, 94 B.U. L. REV. 711
(2014); Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional Design, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 913 (2014); Douglas Kriner & Andrew Reeves, The Electoral College and
Presidential Particularism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 741 (2014); Melnick, supra note 59; Stephen
Skowronek, Twentieth-Century Remedies, 94 B.U. L. REV. 795 (2014).
172 See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 385-93.
173 See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 171, at 11-12.
174 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, at ix-x (1994) (discussing the shortcomings of the modern
confirmations process, particularly how that process abandons rational critique in favor of
rhetorical lambasting, its failure to consider the potential in an intellectually complex public
servant, and its requirement that nominees disclose their positions on controversial issues
prior to confirmation); MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 6-7 (1994) (“The current [confirmation] process is
disorderly, contentious, and unpredictable.”); David Savage, Roberts Urges End to Partisan
Stalling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, at AA2 (“[T]he Senate approved only 60 of President
Obama’s court nominees in the last two years. That was the lowest total for a new president
in four decades.”).
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the New Deal/Great Society Era.175 The reason seems simple. Historically,
both partisanship and ideology correlate strongly with Senate support for a
presidential judicial nominee.176 In a constitutional order structured by two
nonideological parties, conflict over judicial nominees is unlikely because
presidential judicial nominees tend to be supported by most members of their
party and by those members of the rival party who share the President’s
ideological orientation. Earl Warren was supported both by Republicans and
liberal Democrats.177 When constitutional politics is structured by ideological
parties, conflict over judicial nominees is far more likely because very few
members of the rival party share the President’s ideological orientation.
Justices Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan faced more opposition than any
member of the Warren Court because, by the twenty-first century, virtually all
of the partisan rivals of the President were also the ideological rivals of the
President.178
The filibuster provides an even clearer example of a practice that facilitated
constitutional commitments during the New Deal/Great Society Era while
contributing to the present dysfunctional order. Gregory Koger’s history of
obstruction in the Senate claims that, before the late 1960s, Senators seeking to
expand the number of interests served by proposed legislation most often used
filibusters as bargaining devices.179 Race aside,180 the filibuster as practiced
often contributed to the pluralist bargaining processes central to the
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See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 174, at 3 (“[F]or almost seventy years the confirmation
process was distinguished by a strong presumption in favor of deference to presidential
prerogative . . . .”).
176 LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 106-13 (2005) (“The partisan climate surrounding the Senate’s deliberations
and the candidate’s ideology also play roles, and critical ones at that.” Id. at 106.).
177 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 201-02 (5th ed.
2008) (recounting Chief Justice Warren’s confirmation process, which was initially stalled
by a few “conservative Southern Democrats” but concluded with unanimous support for his
confirmation).
178 See id. at 321-22 (describing wholesale Democratic opposition to the nominee put
forward by Republican President George W. Bush, resulting from both party loyalty and
ideological aversion); Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Kagan as Justice,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting that Justice Kagan, nominated by Democratic
President Obama, received the support of only five Republicans, while the remaining
conservatives remained skeptical of her commitment to “the rule of law” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
179 GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE
HOUSE AND SENATE 4-5 (2010) (claiming that “classic filibustering was a bargaining game”
and providing an example of one such filibuster in which Senator La Follette and a group of
like minded Senators sought to block a bill that “they considered a gift to the financial
elite”).
180 “Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the show?”
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constitutional order at mid-century.181 When proponents of racial equality
came to favor their position (almost) as strongly as white supremacists, the
filibuster in the Senate was overcome, and strong bipartisan majorities passed
civil rights legislation.182 At present the filibuster more often serves as a means
to prevent any legislation from passing.183 Republicans during debates over
health care, for example, more often sought to thwart the Clinton and Obama
Administrations than attempted to seek a more compromised plan. William
Kristol spoke for many partisans when he insisted that Democratic healthcare
plans should be opposed “sight unseen” as “a serious political threat to the
Republican party.”184
Other veto points have the same capacity as the filibuster to facilitate or
impede constitutional commitments. All practices that permit legislative
minorities to obstruct the legislative process foster more pluralistic legislative
inputs and outputs under certain conditions of political competition, and
prevent legislatures from accomplishing anything else under other
circumstances of political competition. Keith Krehbiel analyzes the
presidential veto and documents why that and related mechanisms promote
compromise in some situations and gridlock in others.185 Krehbiel’s analysis
highlights why one cannot determine whether a constitutional order has too
many veto points with an abacus or computer. The numbers do not matter.
What matters is whether constitutional politics is structured in ways that
provide incentives for political actors to use veto points as bargaining
strategies or for blocking purposes.186 American politics is presently
dysfunctional because the same veto points that may have promoted more
181

See KOGER, supra note 179, at 5 (2010) (“[C]lassic filibustering was a bargaining
game.”).
182 See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY 142-44 (1990) (recounting the mounting factors that enabled civil rights
leaders to defeat the Southern Democratic filibuster, including increased popular pressure
and “the superior organization of the Senate leadership”).
183 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041,
1043-46 (2011) (discussing the Senate’s routine use of the filibuster to prevent legislative
action).
184 LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 65 (quoting William Kristol); see also LAWRENCE R.
JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS 63-64 (rev. ed.
2012) (explaining that Republicans used “whatever rules were available to slow the
legislative process” to thwart Democratic healthcare reform).
185 See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 229-36
(1998) (theorizing that the presidential veto “contributes to policy stability . . . in instances
in which the status quo is moderate . . . and it dampens the degree of convergence to the
median legislator’s ideal point when the status quo lies just outside the gridlock interval on
the president’s side of the ideological spectrum”).
186 Id. at 230-31 (suggesting that the number of veto points and potential for gridlock are
inconsequential because our system, when stymied by gridlock, is appropriately “responsive
and central tending”).
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consensual legislation fifty years ago are now more often means for preventing
governing officials from accomplishing such basic constitutional purposes as
staffing the judiciary and funding basic services.
Veto points play two important roles in contemporary American
constitutional politics. First, and in some ways less important, they freeze
politics. Americans cannot agree on a budget or staff vital federal agencies
because all parties to debates have the ability to block proposals by the other
and no one has an incentive to compromise.187 Second, and more important,
the veto points that made sense in an earlier constitutional order help prevent
the transition to a more functional constitutional order. Veto points raise the
bar for altering constitutional politics, a bar neither party has been able to
hurdle. The supermajoritarian requirements of Article V are “the most
important bars of our constitutional iron cage”188 at present, but only because
Americans in 2013, as opposed to Americans in 1963, are incapable of
achieving a consensus on any formal, semiformal, or informal constitutional
change.
B.

Moving On

Constitutional reformers at the turn of the twenty-first century face a more
daunting challenge than did their predecessors 100 years ago. The collapse of
the Constitution of 1868 left the field open for nonideological parties to
restructure the constitutional universe in their image. The absence of any
ideological party facilitated efforts to transform constitutional institutions and
commitments to fit more closely with and entrench the existing structure of
constitutional politics. The resulting constitutional reforms of the New Deal
were achieved with minimal social disruption because they largely preserved
the structure of partisan competition in the United States. The collapse of the
Constitution of 1937 creates nearly insuperable obstacles to various projects of
constitutional reform. Levinson and his supporters seek constitutional changes
that will undermine rather than further entrench the existing structure of
constitutional politics. Rather than realign the constitutional order to fit better
the existing structure of partisan competition, they hope for an entirely new
regime. Americans have never experienced this form of revolutionary
constitutional change. Their constitutional experience suggests that whatever
constitutional reform takes place in the near future is more likely to be
preservative. The most likely probability is that constitutional reforms will
fashion a new constitutional order designed to entrench the more successful of
the polarized parties and to facilitate governance by that polarized party.
Successful constitutional reform in the United States has historically been
initiated and managed by the dominant political forces in society. Republicans
187

See BINDER, supra note 171, at 12-33 (explaining that changes in the Senate’s
structure, the balance of power between the Senate, the House, and the rise of politically
polarized parties created tension points that contributed to legislative deadlock).
188 LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 167.
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during the Civil War drafted and ratified the post–Civil War amendments.189
Liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans were responsible for constitutional
reform during the New Deal Era.190 George Washington was part of the
national elite who replaced the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution
of the United States.191 That Constitution was ratified in large part because the
most politically prominent Americans supported the text during the late
eighteenth century.192
The goal of most successful constitutional reforms in the United States is to
entrench the existing structure of political competition and align other
constitutional practices so that the dominant political forces can operate the
constitutional order more effectively. Republicans during Reconstruction
regarded their coalition as the legitimate party of the loyal people.193 Their
constitutional reforms sought to fashion a constitutional order that they
believed would entrench the legitimate party of the loyal people and enable
those people to govern more effectively.194 Liberal Republican and Democrats
during the twentieth century celebrated “the end of ideology.”195 Their
constitutional reforms sought to fashion a constitutional order that they
believed would entrench two nonideological parties and promote liberal
pluralism. The Framers who scrapped the Articles of Confederation were
members of the dominant national elite who fretted about the quality of the
representatives elected to local legislatures and the quality of legislation such
legislators produced.196 Their constitutional reforms sought to entrench rule by

189

GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 250 (discussing the instrumental role that
Republicans played in drafting and enacting the post–Civil War amendments).
190 See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 480 (explaining that, during the New
Deal/Great Society Era, “the liberal spirit in the United States was bipartisan,” and that the
“Supreme Court was a bastion of bipartisan constitutional liberalism”).
191 See Stanley M. Elkins & Eric McKitrick, Youth and the Continental Vision, reprinted
in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 213, 241-45 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed.
1987); see also CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 123-24 (2008) (observing that
revolutionary leaders struggled in the post-revolutionary era to maintain the elite class of
leadership that they envisioned would govern the United States).
192 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 134-39 (1996) (acknowledging the influence of President George
Washington and Benjamin Franklin on the ratification debates).
193 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
194 See Graber, supra note 37, at 6.
195 See supra note 159 and accompanying text (arguing that the mid-twentieth-century
parties were nonideological, with elites in both parties agreeing on major issues).
196 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787),
reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 57, 57-65 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) (enumerating the new republic’s
vices, many of which lay with state legislatures and their elected officials).
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virtuous national elites who could remain above the partisan strife.197 These
new constitutional orders do not function as expected for more than a
generation, if that. Nevertheless, most (temporarily) successful exercises of
constitutional reform in the United States are better described as “hegemonic
preservation,” as efforts by existing elites to realign politics to preserve a
favorable constitutional politics,198 than as means for undermining the existing
structure of political competition.
This history suggests that whatever constitutional reform takes place in the
foreseeable future will be initiated and managed by one or both polarized
parties. Rather than a means for escaping the structure of contemporary
constitutional politics, successful constitutional reform will consist of the
combination of formal, semiformal, and informal constitutional changes
necessary for one or both ideological parties to operate the constitutional order
effectively. No good reason exists for thinking the partisan cats will be belled.
Both the present Republican and the present Democratic Party are too
entrenched to go away, merely because both are incapable of cooperating with
the other to the degree necessary to operate the Constitution of 1937.199 Those
mice still committed to transforming the constitutional order may be limited to
determining which cat’s project of constitutional reform they will support.
Some possibility exists that constitutional reforms in the near future will
moderate the course of American constitutional politics. Democratic and
Republican Party elites, aware that gridlock is inhibiting the realization of
basic constitutional purposes, may take the steps necessary to strengthen the
most centrist institutions and practices in the American constitutional order.
For almost a generation, a Supreme Court controlled by surviving moderates
was able to produce acceptable compromises on some issues.200 Perhaps that
practice can be continued and other centrist institutions built up, although
prospects are unlikely.201
The more probable constitutional changes in the near future will occur after
one party gains temporary crucial control over all crucial constitutional
institutions and takes immediate steps to restructure the constitutional order in
its image. Such politicians as Senator Ted Cruz are more likely to influence the
197 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 253-59
(1992) (explaining that the Federalists envisioned a federal government composed of
virtuous “disinterested umpires,” who were above local interests, and who “promot[ed] an
exclusively public sphere of activity in government,” as opposed to engaging in “interest
mongering”).
198 See HIRSCHL, supra note 25, at 11.
199 See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
200 See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 641, 688 (2004) (describing the Warren Court as “ending the sectional
nature of constitutional disputes”).
201 See Graber, supra note 147, at 704-12 (predicting that politicians will experience an
ideological swing on major issues in the future, rather than fostering the continuance or
centering of a polarized status quo).
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shape of this new constitutional universe202 than are the reformers who hope
for those constitutional changes that will reduce the influence of polarizing
politicians on the future course of American constitutionalism. The model for
this constitutional change will more likely be 1868, when Republicans sought
constitutional reforms that would entrench their party and their party’s
constitutional commitments, rather than 1937, when constitutional reform was
a bipartisan project. If in fact 1868 is the model, then the path to constitutional
change is likely to be far bloodier and repressive than the course anticipated by
those reformers who hope to bell the partisan cats.

202 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, A Republican Voice with Tea Party Mantle and Intellectual
Heft, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at A1.

